ABSTRACT
The Niger Delta – the geographical heart of
oil production in Nigeria has been a breeding ground for militants for some
years now. This is because the discovery of oil and its exploitation has
ushered in a miserable, undisciplined, decrepit, and corrupt form of
‘petro-capitalism’ which produces conflict accelerating factors. Devastated by
the ecological costs of oil spillage and underdevelopment, the Niger Delta has
become a centre of violence. In an attempt to solve the Niger Delta crises, the
Federal Government recently introduced the policy of amnesty to militants as
the solution to the Niger Delta Crises. The study assessed the Amnesty
Programme which is basically a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR) to the Niger Delta militants and effect on national security. Utilizing
the theory of the post-colonial state, the study argued that the amnesty
programme to the Niger Delta militants was basically oriented towards enhancing
the security situation in the Niger Delta region for the purpose of increasing
crude oil production. Employing qualitative method and relying on secondary
sources, relevant data were generated and analyzed using qualitative
descriptive method. The study therefore contended that there was nexus between
the Amnesty Programme to the Niger Delta militants and increased in crude oil
production in Nigeria. Arising from these therefore, it is our recommendation
that the federal government should urgently and comprehensively tackle the
underlying economic and social problems of the Niger Delta region so as to
prevent a relapse into crises.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.2 STATEMENT
OF THE PROBLEM
1.3 OBJECTIVES
OF THE STUDY
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE STUDY
CHAPTER
TWO
LITERATURE
REVIEW
The Gap
CHAPTER
THREE
METHODOLOGY
3.1 THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
3.1.1 THE
APPLICATION OF THE THEORY
3.2 HYPOTHESES
3.3 METHOD
OF DATA COLLECTION
3.4 METHOD
OF DATA ANAYSIS
3.5 RESEARCH
DESIGN
3.6 VALIDITY
AND RELIABILITY OF DATA
CHAPTER
FOUR
DISARMAMENT
OF MILITANTS AND CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA
4.1. THE
NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA
4.2 NIGER
DELTA PEOPLE AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT
4.3. STATE’S
RESPONSE
4.4. DISARMAMENT
OF NIGER DELTA MILITANTS
4.5. DISARMAMENT
OF MILITANTS AND CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA
CHAPTER
FIVE
DEMOBILIZATION
OF THE MILITANTS AND KIDNAPPING IN NIGER DELTA
5.1. GENESIS
OF ARMED MILITANTS IN NIGER DELTA
5.2. STRUCTURES
OF INJUSTICE AND MILITANCY IN THE NIGER DELTA
5.2.1. KIDNAPPING
5.2.2. KIDNAPPING
IN THE NIGER DELTA
5.3. DEMOBILIZATION
OF THE MILITANTS
5.3.1. Demobilization
5.3.2. THE
DEMOBILISATION PROGRAMME AT THE OBUBRA CAMP
5.3.3. POST
DEMOBILIZATION OF MILITANTS IN NIGER DELTA
CHAPTER
SIX
REINTEGRATION
OF THE MILITANTS AND OIL PIPELINE VANDALISM
6.1. OIL
AND THE NIGERIAN STATE
6.1.1 OIL
INDUSTRY OPERATIONS IN NIGER DELTA
6.1.2 OIL
PIPELINE VANDALIZATION
6.1.3 HISTORICAL
FACTORS LEADING TO VANDALIZATION
6.1.4 ACTORS
6.2 REINTEGRATION
OF THE MILITANTS
6.2.1 POST
REINTEGRATION NIGER DELTA
CHAPTER
SEVEN
SUMMARY,
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 SUMMARY
7.2 CONCLUSIONS
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
REFERENCES
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the advent of commercial oil
production in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in 1958, the region was
essentially a pristine environment which supported substantial subsistence
resources for the mostly sedentary population. The region accounted for a large
percentage of Nigeria’s commercial fisheries industry (Afinotan, 2009). For
centuries therefore, the people of the Niger Delta were content to engage in
farming, fishing and such other endeavours like pottery, mat-making and
hunting, unaware that underneath their soil was one of nature’s most prized
mineral resources.
Crude oil was discovered in the Niger
Delta over fifty years ago, with the discovery of oil in Oloibiri in 1956 by
Shell Petroleum Development Company (Aaron and George, 2010). Since, oil has
become the main stay of the Nigerian Economy, contributing over 90 percent of
foreign exchange earnings of the government, it is surprising that the
trajectory of constitutional development, socio-economic development and class
formation have been massively influenced and dictated by the politics of oil
(Owugah, 1999). While the Nigerian State may see the availability of the crude
resources as a ‘Blessing’ and a source of pre-eminence in the global market
place, the communities where this crude resource is endowed with, see it as a
‘Curse’.
This is because the massive exploitation
of crude oil creates serious developmental, social and environmental problems
which the Nigerian state and the collaborative oil giants have neglected for a
long time (Omotola, 2006). Lamenting about this state of affairs, Owugah
(1999:106) observes that “The oil which brought so much wealth to the nation
and those in power, brought much poverty, disease, death, loss of livelihood,
to the people of the oil bearing areas”.
With the emergence of a pan-Niger Delta
militia group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in
2006, the struggle for local control of Nigeria’s oil assumed a more violent
dimension. Apart from MEND that appears to have clearly articulated grievances
namely Environmental Insecurity and Socio-Economic Marginalization of the Niger
Delta people, sundry groups emerged in the Niger Delta as well. Some of these
groups, it would appear, were driven not by liberation ideology but crime and
criminality. Independently the activities of these groups created a difficult
security challenge in Nigeria’s oil belt (Aaron, 2010).
Oil installations were attacked and oil
workers particularly expatriate staffs, at any rate, initially, were taken
hostage for ransom. All these were happening, in spite of the heavy presence of
the Joint Task Force (JTF), comprising of the Navy, Army and Air force, who
were sometimes over ran by the superior fire power of the militants (Aaron,
2010). The implications of this parlous security were grave. Oil production
figures plummeted to all time low, as many TNCs announced production shut-ins.
Specifically, average production figure for 2009 was around 1.6million barrels
per day(bpd), down from 2.7milllion bpd(NNPC,2009). The country lost an estimated $92 billion in
oil export earnings to production shut-in and crude oil theft associated with
the activities of militants (Davis, 2009). The cumulative effect of this was a
drastic fall in the country’s oil exports. Consequently, public finance was
subjected to one of the worst crises since independence.
In what appears an admission of the
futility of violent response, late President Umaru Yar’Adua, on 25th June,
2009, announced an amnesty for militants who were willing to surrender their
arms. The amnesty programme was in phases: Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Aaron (2010). Disarmament of militants entailed the
physical removal of the means of combat from ex belligerents (weapons,
ammunition). Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active
combatants from armed groups, followed by processing of individual combatants
in temporary centres with provision of support packages. Reintegration entails
the process of reintegrating former combatants/militants into civil society
ensuring against the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict (Nwachukwu
and Pepple, 2011).
The first phase lasted between 6th
August and 4th October 2009 (Newswatch, November 9, 2009). The
amnesty programme has been hailed by many as successful given the quantity of
arms surrendered by the militants. Five years after the proclamation of the
amnesty and implementation of the major components of the programme by Goodluck
Jonathan’s administration following the demise of President Musa Yar’Adua. This
study sets out to explore the nexus between the Amnesty programme granted the
Niger Delta militants and National Security. However, the study will
investigate the effect of disarmament of the militants on crude oil production
in Nigeria on one hand, and the effect of demobilization and reintegration of
militants on kidnapping and oil pipeline vandalization on the other hand.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The deployment of the Joint Military Task
Force (JTF) to restore order and create a conducive atmosphere to do business
could not tame the militants. However, no State relies exclusively on the use
of violence or force to ensure social order. It resorts to non-violent
strategies as well, especially, when it comes under intense pressure from the
people which threaten the interest of its survival. At such times, the state
makes what Parenti (1974:274) terms “symbolic concession” to pacify the people.
Thus, confronted with persistently intense agitation from the communities, the
Nigerian State, in response, adopted the strategy of symbolic concessions. The
State, thus, raised the percentage on derivation of the oil producing states
from 1.5% to 3% and later 13% (Owugah, 2010). It is also within this context
that the setting up of series of development commissions for the Niger Delta
should be understood. The commissions started with the Niger Delta Development
Board (NDDB) in 1960 followed by the Niger Delta River Basin Development
Authority (NDRBA) in 1976, then the Oil Producing Areas Development Commission
(OMPADEC) in 1992. Ibeanu (2002:31) argues that “OMPADEC became, in the popular
consciousness of people of Niger Delta, another ruse designed to enrich the
families and friends of the military government while pretending to be
investing in the Niger Delta”. The failure of OMPADEC to achieve its desired
expectations coupled with the intensity of Ijaw ethnic struggles led to the
establishment of Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. The NDDC,
like its predecessors, failed to record significant improvement in the welfare
of the Niger Delta people because it gave room to financial misappropriation
and profligacy (Omotola, 2007). Owugah (2010:194) argues “Therefore, by
establishing these agencies, it pacifies some members of the communities and
also gains the support of others in the non-oil producing areas. Secondly, it
provides an avenue for patronage to members of its hegemonic class with the
awards of contracts, consultancies and supplies of materials for the projects.
These projects became another money-making source for members of the ruling
class. For one thing, they were fully paid for contracts, even though the
projects were not undertaken, abandoned or uncompleted. The Niger Delta
landscape is littered with such projects. Yet, no one has ever been asked to
refund any amount or prosecuted in the law courts”. When Late Musa YarAdua
assumed office as the nation’s president, he came up with his own idea of
developing the Niger Delta, which he tagged “Niger Delta Development
Plan”. Nothing has been done in this
regard. He also set up the Ministry of Niger delta Affairs. Again, on 25 June
2009 he granted amnesty to the “militants” via Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) to turn in their weapons within sixty (60) days (Aaron,
2010). In addition, they militants were to renounce violence through the
execution of renunciation of militancy form. The repentant militants were to be
paid the sum of N65, 000(about $430) per month for 42 months that the rehabilitation
programme would cover. This is addition to daily feeding allowance of N1500
(about $10). Beyond disarmament, repentant militants are to undergo some form
of skills acquisition to enable them live economically productive lives (Aaron,
2010).
The leaders of the militants,
including Ekpemupolo( Tompolo), Henry
Okah, Asari Dokubo, Fara Dagogo, Ebi Ben, Ateke Tom, Saboma Jackrich (alias
Egberipapa), gave up their weapons.
Tompolo and his group gave “117 assorted rifles, 5,467 rounds of live ammunitions,
20 camouflage bullet jacket, 26 camouflage uniform and two helmets. By official
account, about
26,356 militants surrendered
their arms at various disarmament centres. On the whole the total of 26,760
guns of different types 287,445 rounds of ammunition, 18 gun boats and 1090
dynamites were surrendered” (Omadjohwoefe, 2011:254).
The Amnesty programme granted to the militants
of Niger Delta has drawn the attention of writers. Omadjohwoefe (2011), Ibaba
(2011), and Egwemi (2010) argued that, the amnesty initiative, though a unique
approach, does not have what it takes to answer the Niger Delta question.
Olatoke and Olokooba (2012) argued that the amnesty programme is yet to be
passed into law and as such unconstitutional.
Smoke (2009) opined that managers of the Nigerian system should develop
strategies to deal with the post amnesty challenges and that all stakeholders
need to be involved in actualizing the implementation of the post amnesty
programme. Aluede (2012) argued that the way
the programme has been implemented to cost several billion naira to benefit a
few people who have committed crimes against the state is wrong.
The efforts of scholars thus, appear to
neglect the effect of the disarmament of the militants on crude oil production
in Nigeria. It is, therefore, this gap
among others in the literature that this study is aimed at filling based on the
following research questions:
1. Did
the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increase crude oil production in
Nigeria?
2. Did
the Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduce kidnapping in the Niger
Delta region?
3. Did
the Reintegration of Niger Delta militants fail to reduce oil pipeline
vandalization?
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The central objective of this
study is to evaluate the impact of the amnesty programme granted to the Niger
Delta militants and effects on national security in Nigeria. This research
tends to explore the nexus between the amnesty programme via Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration granted to the Niger Delta militants and
national security.
However, the study is set to
achieve the understated specific objectives:
1. To
determine whether the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increased crude oil
production in Nigeria.
2. To
determine whether the Demobilization of Niger Delta militants reduced
kidnapping in the Niger Delta region.
3. To
ascertain whether the Reintegration of Niger Delta militants failed to reduce
oil pipeline vandalization.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE STUDY
The research
has both Theoretical and Practical significance.
Theoretically, this study will contribute to
the scholarly debate on the amnesty programme granted to the Niger Delta
militants and effects on national security in Nigeria. This study explores the
amnesty programme whose dynamics either impacts or transforms the lives of the
people of the Niger delta region in Nigeria. It will also investigate the
amnesty programme as panaceas for peace in the Niger delta region.
Practically, the outcome of this study will be
instrumental to socio-economic and political development of the Niger Delta in
particular and the Nigerian state in general,
it will help the policy makers to reposition, complement or change the
strategies and methods of intervention in the Niger Delta so as to achieve
maximum results. Finally, if the study succeeds in clarifying issues and
facilitating understanding, it will enrich the pool of literature on the Niger
Delta to the benefit of researchers and students.
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