TABLE
OF CONTENT
TITLE … … … … … … … … i
CERTIFICATION … … … … … … ii
DEDICATION … … … … … … … iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT … … … … … iv
TABLE OF CONTENT … … … … … vii
SHORT BIOGRAPHY … … … … … ix
GENERAL INTRODUCTION … … … … xi
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 MODES OF
BEING IN JEAN PAUL SARTRE … 1
1.1 Meaning of
being … … … … … … 1
1.2 Being-in-itself
(L’etre en soi) … … … 4
1.3 Being-for-itself
(L’etre pour soi) … … … 8
1.4 Being-for-others
(L’etre pour autrui) … … … 12
CHAPTER TWO
2.0
General Notion of Freedom … … … … 16
2.1. Definition of
The Term freedom … … … 16
2.2 Some
philosophers view of freedom … … … 17
2.3 Kinds of
freedom … … … … … … 21
2.4 Freedom and
Determinism … … … … 27
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 Sartre’s Freedom … … … … … … 30
3.1 Freedom: The
basis of human existence … … 31
3.1.1 Responsibility … … … … … … 36
3.1.2 Inauthentic
existence (Bad faith) … … … 41
3.1.3 The question
of God (Sartre’s Atheism) … … 44
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 Evaluation
and Conclusion … … … … 50
4.1 Evaluation … … … … … … … 50
4.2 Conclusion … … … … … … … 56
BIBLIOGRAPHY … … … … … … … 58
SHORT
BIOGRAPHY OF JEAN PAUL SARTRE,
Jean Paul
Sartre was born in 1905 by Jean Batiste, a naval officer and Anne Marie
Schiveitzer. He was educated at Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris where he
proved himself as an academician. While still at the Ecole Normale Sartre was
attracted to philosophy through the inspiration of Henri Bergson whose “Essai
Sur les donnees immediates de la conscience’ made him (Sartre) feel that
philosophy is absolutely terrific, you can learn the truth through philosophy.
He studied Husserl’s phenomenology at the Institute Francais in Berlin between
1934-35. in 1936 Sartre wrote his “Transcendental Ego” m Germany. He also
published his novel “Nausea” while still in Berlin which he ever considered as
his best work even at the end of his profession.
During the
World War II, Sartre was active in the French Resistance Movement and became a
German prisoner of war. While in the prisoner-of-war camp, he read about
Heidegger’s philosophical work and the notes he took on Heidegger at the time
strongly influenced Sartre. According to him, these notes were full of
observations which later found their way into Being and Nothingness. For
a period, he taught at the Lycee of Havre, the Lycee Henri IV and the Lycee
Cordorcet, afterward resigning to devote himself exclusively to his writings
which ultimately numbered over thirty volumes. As a sequel to “Being and
nothingness” (1943), Sartre wrote another work entitled “critique of
Dialectical Reason (1960). His last book was the three-volume work on Flaubert:
(The idiot of the family 1971 – 72)
Although Sartre was deeply influenced by Marxism and
continued to be a political activist, he was never a member of the communist
party. Because of his commitment as an activist, he resisted personal acclaim
and when he was awarded the Nobel prize in literature in 1964, he refused to
accept it on the ground that he did not want to be “transformed into an
institution. In declining health and virtually blind, Sartre died on April 15,
1980 at the age of seventy four.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The topic of this thesis is Sartre’s notion of freedom.
The notion of freedom has raised a lot of dust in different philosophical
epochs yet it remained problematic. Man’s experience of his own behaviour seems
to reveal to him that he is free, that he has ability to decide for himself, to
deliberate on what to do in various situations and to come to his own conclusions
about what to do or believe what he does. Also everyday experience leads man to
believe that he often has a choice between alternative courses of action. We
punish, condemn, or blame individuals for making certain choices and decisions
and insist that they ought to have done something else, and if they had had,
they would then be deserving of rewards praise.
However, at
a time, what we believe to be a free decision seems to have been influenced in
way or another by various psychological and social factors, so that it may look
as if we did not actually decide what we do “freely”. So the notion of freedom
makes one to ask some basic questions like; what is freedom? Is man actually?
To what extent can we decide what to do? Does he really decide what to do, or
does he simple do what he has been programmed to do by certain antecedent
conditions? These and many other questions preoccupy and puzzle our minds while
discussing the notion of freedom. So it is an attempt to answer these questions
and a whole lot of others that this thesis is devoted.
Sartre in
his philosophy advocates for freedom. He holds that man is absolutely and
necessarily free. Man is the creator of himself and man is condemned to be
free, condemned because he finds himself thrown into the world yet free because
as soon as he is conscious of himself, he is responsible for everything he
does. We will equally notice the influence of Sartre’s predecessors in Sartre’s
philosophical thought great philosophers like Nietzsche, kierkegaard, Heidegger,
Husserl etc. really had a remarkable influence on Sartre.
Sartre’s
atheism could be compared to Nietzsche’s idea of God. Nietzsche asserts that
God is dead hence man has to create meaning in his life. Sartre was highly
confinable with this idea since for him (Sartre) appearance is the only
reality, man is condemned to be free and as there is no God, anything is
permissible. He was of the view that existence precedes essence. This is the
core of his philosophy.
This work
is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, we shall concentrate on
the existentialists idea of being. We shall then treat Sartre’s meaning of
being which is divided into two, namely being-in-itself and being-for-itself.
We shall also put into consideration the third mode of being which is concerned
with the relationship between a being-for-itself and another being-for-itself.
In chapter
two, we shall try to expose the general meaning of freedom which will lead us
to x–ray some of the philosophers’ views on concept of freedom and try to
differentiate between different kinds of freedom. Also in this chapter, we
shall treat the problem of freedom and determinism since some people are of the
view that human actions and decisions are influenced by various psychological
and social factors.
Having
established the general idea of freedom, we shall then dwell in chapter three
on Sartre’s idea of freedom which is the central theme of this work. But
according to Sartre, this freedom cannot exist without absolute responsibility
hence freedom and responsibility are prerequisite for human existence. He sees
authentic existence as a resultant fact of life lived in freedom and
responsibility. The second part of this chapter will try to expose Sartre’s
idea of inanthentic existence which he called bad faith.
In order to
defend his philosophical thoughts, Sartre denied the existence of God which we
shall elaborate clearly in last part of this chapter. Finally in chapter four,
we shall critically evaluate Sartre’s philosophical thoughts and then arrive at
a conclusion.
CHAPTER ONE
1.0
MODES OF BEING IN JEAN PAUL SARTRE
1.1 MEANING OF BEING.
Being in all its fullness, and as the ground of
all beings remains a great mystery. All the philosophical epochs have tried in
diverse ways without success, to expound a wholesome review of this question.
According to L. Okika, he stated that,
The initial difficulty about being or reality is that, it is so very
obvious, so that it is preternaturally easy to overlook; and yet at the same
time, we find that if we try to construct a strictly logical argument to
demonstrate what being is, we cannot do so.
It is never a doubt that, history of philosophy is a
history of problem; hence the question of being is never a new question. Though
the problem of being is as old as time, it has continued to arouse the
curiosity of many philosophers. The question of being remained unsolved
because, it has no logical status or possesses a logical status so reduced that
it cannot be what it appears to be, consequently, it has no logical status.
Some
philosophers of different epochs came up with the aim of providing a permanent
solution to this problem. Prominent among are Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato,
Aristotle, Aquinas et cetara. Parmenides declared that 'what is, is' and 'what
is not, is not’ in relation to being, so also other philosophers continued to
explore and expose this question of being.
Etymologically,
being has a Latin and Greek derivative ‘Ens and ‘ons’ meaning; ‘which is’ and
‘that which exists’ respectively. Due to the fact that being lacks univocal
definition, it could only be described, hence different philosophers have their
views about being. For instance, Thomas Aquinas and Martin Heidegger gave their
own definition of being. Thomas Aquinas defined it as, “that whose act is to
be” But for Heidegger, “Being is the most universal and
the emptiest of all concepts. As such, it resists every attempt at definition”
We are
here concerned primarily with the question of being in the existentialist
philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre. The question of being proved problematic for
Sartre like every other philosopher. In his utmost desire to locate and situate
being, he came in contact with existence hence he writes:
…Usually existence hides himself. It is there around us, it is in us,
you cannot say a couple of words without speaking of it but finally you cannot
touch it.
Sartre after locating the question of existence began
fully to treat the problem of being. He categorizes existence into two major
kinds of being namely; Being-in- itself (L’etre-en-soi) and Being-for-itself
(L’etre-pour-soi). In his major philosophical text, Being and Nothingness,
being-in-itself is one of the key concepts. However, it may not be surprising
that most of this work is devoted to being-in-itself, for according to Sartre,
being-in-itself is opaque, massive, self identical and of this existence, there
is little that can be said about it. Moreover, Sartre being an existentialist
is primarily concerned with the beingness of man or as he prefers to put it,
“the human reality”.
1.1.1 BEING-IN-ITSELF
(L’ETRE EN SOI)
Being-in-itself stands non-conscious things, which can be said to have
essence, which exist independent of any observer and which constitutes all the
things in the world. Being-in-itself is dense, massive and full. It harbours no
nothingness and signifies all the objects around man. It is impermeable and
dense, silent and dead. From it and in it comes no meaning.
This
being-in-itself, Sartre tells us, is simply there. “It is without reason,
without cause and without necessity”. All hopes that are behind their appearance must be
an essence, a “Ding un sich” (thing-in-itself) or any other vehicle of meaning
is futile. Being-in-itself has no “Within’ which is opposed to a “without” and
which is analogous to a judgement, a law, a consciousness of itself. Hence,
this mode of being in all its entirely is absurd. Regarding this Copleston
writes:
If we think away
all that is due to the activity of consciousness in making the world appear, we
are left with being-in-itself, (L’en-soi, the in-itself), opaque, massive,
undifferentiated, the Nebulous background as it were, out of which the world is
made to appear.
Sartre maintains that, this being-in-itself is only illuminated in the
light of non-being. Being-in-itself is therefore, without consciousness and to
this extent, is obviously not free, since, freedom is an attribute of only
conscious being. All objects in this state of being have exhausted all their
potentialities and are left only in the state of actualities. They have nothing
secret and are solid. The in-itself is immovable, dead and cannot move in
itself unless a conscious being moves it. It is ultimately there and is an
isolated being which is not conscious of its existence. Sartre in describing
the origin of this mode of being writes:
…questions on the
origin of being or on the origin of the world are either devoid of meaning or
receive a reply within the actual province of ontology.
Some good example of being-in-itself
includes: stones, blocks, cloths, desk etc. In itself, it exist, it simply is
and is thus, in no need of any compliment. It is uncreated and is without any
relation to another being. This mode of being is opaque to itself precisely
because, it is filled with itself.
The in-itself is full of itself, and no more total plenitude can be
imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the
slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness
might slip in.
Being-in-itself is completely different from
being-for- itself; it is simply put, a world of objects that are simply what
they are. Being-in-itself is solid and at the same time, permanence. It is
these qualities that make it the extreme opposite of the for-itself. The
qualities of the in-itself are mute, shapeless but all the same, they possess
such a great density, which even threaten to overtake and overpower the
for-itself. They exist in themselves independent of any conscious spontaneity.
Using a white sheet of paper, Sartre illustrates that which presents itself to
consciousness.
One thing is certain,
and that is, that white sheet, I observe cannot be the product of my spontaneity.
The inert form, which is beyond all conscious spontaneities and which must be
observed and gradually learned is what is called a ‘thing’.
To this extent then, it is no overstatement to
conclude that, Being-in-itself is a world of existing things, which actually
has no reason to exist, since Sartre denied the existence of God. In the
absence of God, everything just exist without even any rational foundation,
origin and meaning. According to Sartre in his Nausea, “Every existing thing is
born without reason, prolongs itself but
of weakness and dies by chance.”
These words
contain the basic themes of Sartre: existing is absurd, in that it can neither
be explained nor justified; that existing itself is problematic, and bad faith,
and that death too is absurd and wholly beyond anticipation and preparation.
Regis Jolivet, in Sartre ,The theology of the Absurd, paints a striking
picture of the term in-itself. He writes:
The in itself, the
specific revelation of nausea, is being itself: massive, opaque, gloomy and
glutinous. We can say nothing about it except that it is, for it is devoid of
any relationship either interior or exterior. It is so helpless that it cannot
stop itself from being. Where does the in-itself or being come about? From no
place, from nothing. It is without reason, unjustifiable absurd, too much for
all eternity. It is and it proliferates itself horribly obscenely. Any attempt
to explain it is fruitless. First of all, God does not exist being is
self-contradictory. Moreover, the very idea of creation is meaningless.”
1.1.2 BEING-FOR-ITSELF
This is the being of consciousness, capable of
thinking for itself. Making decisions and accordingly, choosing between
alternatives. This consciousness differentiates it from other thing, the in-itself.
We shall consider being-for-itself under two categories: first as consciousness
of an object and secondly, being-for-itself as nothingness. Considering the
being-for-itself as consciousness, we have to acknowledge the fact that, it is
forever incomplete (openness), fluid, vacuous and lacking in determinate
structure; what he is now is neither what he was in the past nor what he will
be in future. It is at this level that it corresponds to the being of human
consciousness. Thus, being-for-itself is equivalent to consciousness. Here, it
should not be forgotten that Sartre was very much influenced by Husserl’s
concept of intentionality, according to which consciousness is always
consciousness of something.
This
means that, “there is no consciousness which is not the position of a
transcendental object or if one prefers, that consciousness has no content”. Suppose for instance, I am aware of this table, the
table is not in my window, or near a window, or near the door or wherever it
may be. And when I intent it, I posit it as transcending and not as immanent in
conscience. One is not wrong them to say that, there is no consciousness
without affirming the existence of an object, which exists beyond and
transcends it. Commenting on this, Stumpf has this to say:
Without consciousness, the world
simply is, it is being-in-itself (L’etre-en-soi) and as such, it is without
meaning of things in the world, though it does not constitute their being
It must be recalled that in Heidegger’s search
for fusion with being, consciousness lost its central position, but in Sartre,
this central position, consciousness was regained. Thus, Sartre realizes very
clearly that consciousness is possessed only by the pour-soi (man). For him,
man is not-something. He is not an already made being and his course is not
predetermined;
…Man is condemned to be free by his choices, man makes himself not that
he creates himself out of nothing but rather, by a series of choices and
decisions. He converts his existence into the essence of his final self.
The for-itself is an extreme opposite of the
in-itself. This was illustrated in philosophical work of Mary Warnock where she
stated that, being-for-itself brings nothing into the world both in the sense
of emptiness and in the sense of negation; Being-for-itself is aware that, it
does not have pure concrete existence. The pour-soi (man) is like an empty
shell but, through his choices in his life, he fills this shell. Sartre quite
agrees that, all consciousness is always consciousness of something but unlike
all other beings this consciousness is embodied and concretized in man. To this
extent then, he is related to the world of things and people in variety of
ways. At one level, man is consciousness of the world, which is everything that
is beyond or other than himself and which therefore, transcends him. At this
level, the world is experienced simply as solid, massive and undifferentiated,
single something that is not yet separated into individual things. Here,
consciousness shifts a person from simply being there, being-in-itself to
being-for-itself where consciousness dramatically differentiates the object of
the world from the conscious self as subject. This brings us to the question of
consciousness and its twofold activities. Stumpf has this to say about the
twofold activity of consciousness:
…First consciousness defines the specific things in the world and invest
them with meaning. Second, consciousness transcends, that is, puts a distance
between itself and objects and in that way, possesses a freedom from those
objects.
Because the conscious self has this freedom from the
things in the world, it is within the power of consciousness to confer
different or alternative meaning on things. The activity of consciousness is
what is usually called choice.
Being-for-itself
in its aspect of nothingness can be perfectly defined as, “being what it is not
and not being what it is”. Sartre explains that man is not what he is in as much as he is not now
what his past has been. At the same time man is what he is not since he is not
as yet the undetermined future which he will become in terms of the choice he
makes.
Sartre admits that consciousness is always a
consciousness of something, something that is extremely different from the
conscious object, hence consciousness is always used to denote a separation
from, a distance from, and above all, a negation of its object
Sartre attempts to demonstrate… that consci-ousness is non-substantial
or nothingness. Nothingness not in the sense of not being anything but a
nihilating activity. As nothingness, it is separated from the object by not
being the object and preserves a distance from it
1.1.3 BEING-FOR-OTHERS (L’ETRE-POUR-AUTRUI)
Generally, being-for-others refers to the inter-human
or inter-subjective relationship, the relationship that exists between the
for-itself and another for itself. The question is, how do I know that there are
other beings in existence except myself? Sartre refashioned the question thus:
what is the fundamental relationship that exists between one person and another
that led him to posit the question of this being for others?
The
certainty of the existence of the other cannot be doubted as Jolivet R. stated
that, once one is in the world, he does not only find out that he is conscious
of himself but also that there are other people imposing themselves on him
which implies relationship. Consequently, this relationship brings about
conflict because looking at other, I reduce him to an object. It is this
being-for-other that Sartre generally calls inter-subjectivity. For Sartre, the
other is ‘‘The one who excludes me by himself, is the one who I exclude by being
myself”, The other is that “self which is not
myself, the one which is not me and the other one whom I am not”.
My apprehension of my own being is so structured that, it presupposes
the existence of other conscious beings which is manifested in the feeling of
shame. In this, I discover simultaneously the other and the aspect of my being
as standing in front of the other, thus I am uncomfortable. The other is
obstacle to the fulfilment of my own existence and his arrival brings about the
alienation of my existence. The whole look of the other is to expose me in my
nakedness and them, empty my whole being into his, that is, terminate my being
as subject into an object. I experience my freedom being threatened by another
who is about to absorb me into the orbit of his concerns. But for Sartre, I can
defend and affirm my freedom in retaliation by rendering the other into an
“it”. The other as well can stage a similar counter attack and the cycle simply
repeats itself. I can defend, affirm and regain, my consciousness in
retaliation by rendering the other an object. For Sartre, conflict is the
original meaning and essence of being-for-others. Each seeks to dominate the
other as a free being, to possess him both as an object and as a free being.
According
to Sartre, there can never be cordial relationship between the other and I. He
contends that the impossibility of achieving true love inevitably begets one or
other of two extreme attitudes. Either I try to make myself a kind of object in
the eyes of the other (masochism) or I try through violence and pain to make
the other an instrument and to pulverize his subjectivity for my own pleasure
(desire, sadism, hate).
From
Sartre’s view then, he calls for a reconsideration of Heidegger’s general
account of being together (mit-sein). For Sartre, there can be consciousness of
community togetherness, a sense of we, as in the case of pre-reflexive outburst
of applause at a concert or at a festival or theatrical performance. But on the
love of reflexive consciousness, it is conflict and “to this extent, them, a
conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others”.
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