Abstract
This study focused into the concept of automated
protection for CSRF prevention in web applications, aiming to explore the
limitations of traditional techniques, highlight the advantages of automation,
investigate various automated protection technologies, and provide insights
into real-world implementations.
The primary aim of this study is to investigate the
concept of automated protection for Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
prevention in web applications. Specifically, it seeks to explore the
limitations of traditional CSRF prevention techniques and the need for
automated solutions. Additionally, it aims to examine the benefits of automated
protection mechanisms in enhancing the security posture of web applications and
investigate various automated protection technologies and methodologies for
CSRF prevention. Furthermore, the study aims to provide insights into
real-world implementations and case studies showcasing the effectiveness of
automated CSRF protection.
The Synchronizer Token Pattern will be utilized to
mitigate CSRF, ensuring secure submission of form values while remaining
mindful of browser history and login CSRF vulnerabilities.
An in-depth analysis of existing defense mechanisms
reveals both advantages and disadvantages, shedding light on the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach. From using post forms to implementing custom HTTP
headers, each defense mechanism offers unique benefits and challenges,
underscoring the complexity of CSRF prevention in real-world scenarios.
Table of Contents
Title Page i
Abstract ii
Table of Contents iii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study 5
1.2 Statement of the
Problems 9
1.3 Aims and Objectives 10
1.4 Significance of the Study 11
1.5 Scope of the Study 12
1.6 Definition of Technical Terms 12
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction 14
2.2 Understanding CSRF 14
2.3 Traditional CSRF
Prevention Techniques 19
2.4 Overview of CSRF 19
2.5 Classifications of CSRF 24
2.5.1 Stored CSRF 24
2.5.2 Reflected CSRF 25
2.5.3 Login CSRF 26
2.6 Traditional CSRF
Prevention Techniques 27
2.6.1 Anti-CSRF
Tokens (Synchronizer Token Pattern): 27
2.6.2 Double Submit Cookie
Pattern: 28
2.6.3 Referrer Header
Checking: 28
2.6.4 Samesite Cookie
Attribute: 29
2.7 Rationale for Automated
Protection 29
2.8 Advantages of Automated
Protection 31
2.9 Techniques and
Technologies for Automated Protection 33
2.10 Challenges and
Considerations 34
2.11 Case Studies and
Real-World Implementations 37
CHAPTER
3
MATERIALS
AND METHODS
3.1 Research
Methodology 39
3.2 Design
Methodology 39
3.2.1 Synchronizer
Token Pattern 39
3.3 Analysis of Existing
System 41
3.3.1 Advantages
and the Disadvantages of Existing Defense Mechanism 43
3.4
The Proposed System 44
3.4.1 Analysis of the Proposed System 44
3.4.2
Architecture of the Proposed System 46
3.4.2.1
Component
of the Proposed System 50
3.5
Algorithm of the Proposed System
55
3.5 Conceptual Design 57
3.5.1 Use
Case Diagram 57
3.5.2 Sequence Diagram 59
3.5.3 Activity
Diagram 60
3.6 Data
Collection 62
References 65
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
Vulnerability is a weakness in the design or coding of an application that can be
exploited by an attacker, to perform unauthorized actions within a computer
system. One of the known web application vulnerabilities is Cross-Site Request
Forgery (CSRF). According to the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP),
cross-site requestforgery is listed as one of the top 10 web application
vulnerabilities of 2013 leading to a security breach (J. Grossman, 2017) and is
often referred to as the “Sleeping Giant” among the critical vulnerabilities
found in Web application (Jovanovic, Kirda and Kruegel, 2016). The cross-site
request forgery attacks was first introduced by Peter Watkins in a posting to
the Bug Traq mailing list, and then it has been picked by web application
developers (Rupali D. Kombade, Dr. B. B. Meshram, 2020).
CSRF is also known as XSRF,
Sea Surf, Confused Deputy, One-click Attack, or Session Riding, in this type of
CSRF attack hacker tricks a web browser into executing an unwanted
(unauthorized forged request) action in an application to which a user is
logged in (Kafer K, 2018). An untrusted website can force the user browser to
send the unauthorized valid request to a trusted website and this can be done
without the knowledge of users. So it is a class of attack on web applications
that exploit the trust of authenticated users. To make it a successful CSRF
attack against the authenticated user, an attacker is able toinstigate an
arbitrary HTTP request using the user credentials to the vulnerable web
application. A successful CSRF attack effectively re-direct the
underlyingauthentication mechanism and it can compromise the end- user personal
data and operation. CSRF attack is when an attacker is able to make requests on
the behalf of a user. The attacker takes advantage of the fact that the user is
already authenticated to a web application or a particular website. CSRF attack
only targets state-changing requests such as changing credentials like
passwords, transferring funds, modifying settings, etc also attacker has no way
to see the response to the forged request but with a little help of social
engineering, an attacker changed the parameters of the script by which the
users of a web application into executing actions of the attacker’s choosing
script. If the victim is a normal user, a successful CSRF attack can force the
user to perform state-changing requests like transferring funds, changing their
email address or password, and so forth. If the victim works on an
administrative level account than CSRF can compromise the whole web application
which may be harmful to the victim.
Rsnake 2006, there are too
many CSRF vulnerabilities on the Internet. The CSRF attacks are typically as
powerful as a user,i.e. any action that the user can perform can also be
performed by an attacker using a CSRF attack. Consequently, the more power a
site gives a user, the more serious are the possible CSRF attacks. For example,
if the victim account has administrator rights, this can compromise the entire
web application.
Customers are provided with
safe web services and they are protected from many web threats. The web has
become an indispensable part of our life. Unfortunately, as our dependency on
the web increases, so does the interest of attackers in exploiting web
applications and web-based information. There are more number of attacks which
exploits the web application and integrity of the web users. By using the web
browser, one can access webmail’s, online banking, community websites, search
engines, and specific businessapplications for each sector, etc. from the
private network or from the Internet. They may contain sensitive information
and it required an authentication.
The general class of cross
site request forgery (XSRF) attacks was first introduced by Peter W in a
posting to the BugTraq mailing list, and it has since been picked up by web application
developers (P.W.Cross 2011). An untrusted website can force the user browser to
send the unauthorized valid request to the trusted site is called as the Cross
site request forgery. This iscan be done by without the knowledge of users. It
is a new class of attack on web applications which exploit the trust
ofauthenticated users. By launching a successful CSRF attackagainst the
authenticated user, an attacker is able to initiatearbitrary HTTP requests
using the user credentials to thevulnerable web application. A successful CSRF
attackeffectively bypasses the underlying authentication mechanismand it can
compromise the end user data and operation. If thevictim account has
administrator rights, this attack cancompromise the entire web
application.Image based CSRF attacks are easy to exploit on the web applications.
HTML image elements and JavaScript imageobjects are the two most popular paths
to CSRF.
There is no solution
available to prevent CSRF attacks using IMGelements. The IMG elements with
static URLs (UniformResource Locator) have predefined extensions (i.e.
.jpg,.bmp,.png, .gif, etc.) in their SRC attribute value (i.e. UniformResource
Identifier or Uniform resource locator), to retrievethe image. By validating
the image extensions (Ramarao R. 2019) in the webpage source code, we can
prevent the CSRF attacks. Manyweb applications forget that HTTP requests they
receive frombrowsers may have been forged by another web page openedin the same
browser. Without the user being aware of it, thismalicious web page can take
over his identity and send are quest to other website on his behalf. This is
also one kind ofattack in Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).which is shown in
the following figure.
In response to
the dynamic nature of modern web applications and the evolving tactics of
attackers, there is an increasing demand for automated solutions to mitigate
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. Automated protection mechanisms can
complement traditional defenses by actively detecting and thwarting CSRF
attacks in real-time, thereby alleviating the burden on developers and
bolstering the overall security of web applications. The complexity of web
applications, coupled with the proliferation of sophisticated attack vectors,
underscores the importance of automated CSRF protection. Manual implementation
of CSRF prevention measures, such as synchronizer tokens or same-site cookies,
is susceptible to human error and may not adequately address emerging threats.
Automated solutions, on the other hand, can continuously monitor application
behavior, analyze incoming requests, and dynamically adjust security controls
to mitigate CSRF risks.
One approach to
automated CSRF protection involves integrating security features directly into
web frameworks and libraries. Many modern frameworks offer built-in CSRF
protection mechanisms that automatically generate and validate tokens, reducing
the need for developers to implement these measures manually. By incorporating
CSRF protection at the framework level, developers can ensure consistent and
robust security across their applications without the need for extensive custom
development.
Additionally,
machine learning and anomaly detection techniques can enhance automated CSRF
protection by identifying and mitigating suspicious request patterns indicative
of CSRF attacks. By analyzing historical traffic data and user behavior,
machine learning algorithms can detect deviations from normal activity and
trigger proactive responses to mitigate potential threats. This adaptive
approach to CSRF prevention allows web applications to adapt to evolving attack
tactics and effectively defend against CSRF attacks in real-time. The dynamic
nature of modern web applications and the evolving threat landscape necessitate
automated solutions for CSRF prevention. By augmenting traditional defenses
with automated protection mechanisms, web applications can proactively detect
and mitigate CSRF attacks, reduce the burden on developers, and enhance overall
security.
1.2 Statement
of the Problems
The
proliferation of web applications in various domains has introduced new
challenges in ensuring the security and integrity of user data and
transactions. Among these challenges, CSRF stands out as a persistent threat
due to its ability to exploit the inherent trust between a user's browser and a
web application. The following key problems underscore the need for automated
protection mechanisms for CSRF prevention:
Manual
Implementation Challenges: Traditional CSRF prevention techniques, such as
synchronizer tokens or same-site cookies, often require manual implementation
by developers. This manual process is prone to errors, inconsistencies, and
oversight, leading to potential vulnerabilities in web applications.
Evolving Attack
Vectors: Attackers are constantly evolving their tactics to bypass traditional
CSRF prevention measures. As a result, web applications may be vulnerable to
sophisticated CSRF attacks that exploit weaknesses in existing mitigation
strategies.
Dynamic Web
Environments: Modern web applications are dynamic and complex, with frequent
updates and changes in functionality. This dynamic nature makes it challenging
to maintain effective CSRF prevention measures manually and necessitates
automated solutions capable of adapting to evolving threats and application
environments.
User Experience
Considerations: While CSRF prevention measures are essential for security, they
should not compromise the user experience of web applications. Automated
protection mechanisms must strike a balance between robust security and
seamless user interaction to ensure optimal usability and security.
Addressing
these problems requires a comprehensive understanding of CSRF prevention
mechanisms and the development of automated protection solutions capable of
effectively mitigating CSRF attacks in dynamic web environments. This study
aims to explore these challenges in-depth and propose strategies for automated
CSRF prevention that align with the evolving needs of web application security.
1.3 Aim and
Objectives of the Study
The primary aim
of this study is to develop an automated protection system for Cross-Site
Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention in Web Applications. The objectives are to:
i.
Explore various automated
protection technologies and methodologies for CSRF prevention.
ii.
Design an automated CSRF
prevention system using Synchronizer Token Pattern techniques
iii.
Implement the system using PHP programming
language
iv.
Perform an evaluation of the
automated CSRF protection system
1.4
Significance of the Study
The
significance of this study lies in its contribution to enhancing the security
posture of web applications against CSRF attacks. By developing an automated
CSRF prevention system, organizations can:
- Reduce the risk of unauthorized
actions: Automated systems can proactively detect and prevent CSRF attacks
in real-time, thereby reducing the likelihood of successful exploitation.
- Improve operational efficiency:
Automated systems streamline the process of CSRF prevention by eliminating
the need for manual intervention, allowing organizations to allocate
resources more effectively.
- Enhance user trust and
confidence: Robust CSRF protection demonstrates a commitment to security
and helps maintain user trust by safeguarding their data and interactions.
1.5 Scope of the Study
This
study focuses on the development and implementation of an automated CSRF
prevention system using advanced techniques such as Synchronizer
Token Pattern.
The scope of the study encompasses the following aspects:
- Analysis of existing CSRF
prevention techniques: The study will review traditional CSRF prevention
techniques and assess their effectiveness in mitigating CSRF attacks.
- Design and development of an
automated CSRF prevention system: The study will propose a novel approach
to automated CSRF prevention.
- Practical implementation
considerations: The study will explore practical considerations for
deploying and integrating the automated CSRF prevention system within
real-world web application environments.
The
scope of the study is limited to the development and evaluation of the
automated CSRF prevention system and does not cover other aspects of web
application security.
1.6 Definition of Technical Terms
- Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF):
A type of web security vulnerability that allows attackers to execute
unauthorized actions on behalf of authenticated users by exploiting the
user's active session.
- Automated CSRF Prevention: The process of proactively
detecting and preventing CSRF attacks in real-time using automated systems
and techniques.
- PHP:PHP
is a general-purpose scripting language geared towards web development. It
was originally created by Danish-Canadian programmer RasmusLerdorf in 1993
and released in 1995.
- Behavioral Analysis: A technique used to detect
anomalies and suspicious behavior by analyzing patterns and deviations
from normal behavior.
- Synchronizer Token: A unique token generated by
the server and embedded in web forms to prevent CSRF attacks by validating
the token with each request.
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